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CASE NOTES
the question of reasonableness has not become irrelevant, since an extreme
unreasonableness on the part of the seller may indicate his lack of good
faith.
The Code provision has the effect of holding the parties to the language
of their contract without imposing upon the buyer a seller's arbitrary
right to retake possession. It seems certain that if an insecurity clause
is so phrased as to confer such an arbitrary right it will be either stricken
under § 2-302 as unconscionable or so limited as to avoid an unconscionable
result.9
 If, however, no unconscionable result would be effectuated, the
buyer may nevertheless find protection under § 1-208. That Section imposes
a duty upon the seller to use good faith in exercising his right under
an insecurity clause. This good faith standard to which the seller is held
would not constitute a deviation in most instances. But if the parties intended
that the seller could act without any obligation of good faith then § 1-208
imposes only a minimum alteration of the contract term and thereby,
in large, allows the parties to contract as they choose. It has been suggested
that any further protection for the debtor in such transactions as retail
installment purchases should be secured by legislation enacted separately
from the Code.I° The Code construction of the insecurity clause seems
more logical and just than that used by the principal case which in effect
varies the contract term to the liking of the court without sufficient
justification.
WILLIAM M. BULGER
Contracts—Accord and Satisfaction—Enforcement of Executory Ac-
cord by Creditor upon Breach by Debtor.—Ohlson v. Steinhauser. 1—
Plaintiff filed an action for breach of promise. Subsequently, by way of
compromise and settlement and discharge of this cause of action, defendant
agreed to pay and plaintiff agreed to accept $6000. Thereafter, the defendant
refused to pay. The plaintiff then brought the present suit to obtain payment
of the $6000. The defendant contended the agreement sued upon was an
accord and satisfaction and not binding and enforceable until the satisfaction
called for was paid, prior to which time either party could revoke. The trial
court entered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme Court
of Oregon affirmed. Held: the defendant's failure to pay the satisfaction
agreed upon could only bar the defendant from pleading the compromise
agreement if the plaintiff had brought suit on the original cause of action.
Such failure cannot be claimed as a defense to the present action.
9 UCC fi 2-302. "Unconscionable Contracts Clause. (1) If the court as a matter
of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
10 See notes to UCC §§ 9-102, 9-203 (1957 ed.).
1 346 P.2d 87 (Ore. Sp. Ct. 1959).
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At common law an executory accord furnished no defense at law to a
suit by the creditor on the original cause of action? This was true even
after recognition of the validity of bilateral contracts? Although it has
been subject to much criticism' the prevailing view today accepts this
common law doctrine.° The Restatement of Contracts, 6 however, states
that although an executory accord does not discharge the claim, it does
suspend the right to enforce it as long as there has not been a breach of the
contract of accord.?
Both in Englands and in the United States° the prevailing view is
2 Peytoe's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 77b, 77 Eng. Rep. 847 (1611).
3 In Allen v. Harris, 1 Ld. Raym. 122, 91 Eng. Rep. 978 (1696), the court held
that: "Upon accord no remedy lies. And the books are so numerous that an accord
ought to be executed that it is now impossible to overthrow all of the books. But
if it had been a new point it might have been worthy of discussion,"
4 Gold, Executory Accords, 21 B.U.L. Rev. 465 (1941) ; Shepherd, The Executory
Accord, 26 Ill. L. Rev. 22 (1931).
6 See 6 Williston, Contracts, §§ 1842, 1843 (Rev. ed. 1938) and cases cited
therein; see also Gold, op. cit., supra note 4.
The accord itself may be accepted as satisfaction and thus be a bar to a suit
on the original cause of action but the intent of the creditor to accept it as such must
be clearly shown. See e.g., McArney v. Scott, 146 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1944); Simmons
v. Clark, 56 Ill. 96 (1870) ; Langlois v. Langlois, 5 App. Div. 2d 75, 169 N.Y.S.2d 170
(3d Dep't 1957); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Brannon, 150 Tex. 441, 242 S.W.2d 185
(1951); 6 Williston, Contracts, §§ 1846, 1847 (Rev. ed. 1938) and cases cited therein;
Restatement, Contracts, §§ 418, 419 (1932).
It is important to distinguish the executory accord from other arrangements.
The creditor may merely make an offer for a unilateral contract; the parties may enter
into a bilateral contract whereby the debtor's promise to give some new performance
is taken as satisfaction; or the parties may enter into a bilateral contract by which the
debtor promises to give and the creditor to receive some new performance without
the creditor accepting the debtor's promise itself as satisfaction. This last type of
arrangement is the executory accord. Shepherd, op. cit., supra note 4, at 22.
43
 Restatement, Contracts, § 417(a) (1932). American Textile Machine Corp.
v. United States, 220 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1955); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33-a(2) (3) and
N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 280(2) (3), interpreted in Langlois v. Langlois, 5 App. Div. 2d
741, 169 N.Y.S.2d 170 (3d Dep't 1957). See also 6 Corbin, Contracts, § 1274 (1951) ; 6
Williston, Contracts, § 1842 (Rev. ed. 1938).
7
 At common law a cause of action could not be suspended without extinguishing
it. Ford v. Beech [1848] 11 Q.B. 852. For criticism of this rule see Shepherd, op. cit.,
supra note 4, at 2941.
8
 British Russian Gazette Etc. v. Associated Newspapers [1933] 2 K.B. 616, 650-
655.
Corrigan v. Payne, 312 Mass. 589, 45 N.E.2d 829 (1942); Hunt v. Brown,
146 Mass. 253, 15 N.E. 587 (1888); Schweider v. Lang, 24 Minn. 254, 13 N.W. 33
(1882) (enforceable by the debtor) ; American Textile Machine Corp. v. United States,
220 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1955); General Foods Corp. v. The Filipe Camarao, 172 F.2d 131
(2d Cir. 1949) ; Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co. v. Empire Box Corp., 41 Del. 386,
23 A.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 42 Del. 432, 36 A.2d 40 '(Sup. Ct. 1944); Alexander v.
Handley, 136 Tex. 110, 146 S.W.2d 740 (1941) (creditor has alternative rights).
See 6 Corbin, Contracts, § 1271 (1951) and cases cited therein; 6 Williston,
Contracts, § 1840, 1848 (Rev. ed. 1938) and cases cited therein; Restatement,
Contracts, § 417 (1932).
See also Calif. Civ. Code § 1522; "Though the parties to an accord are bound
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that an executory accord is a valid contract upon which, on default in per-
formance by one of the parties, the other can maintain an action for
damages. Upon a breach by the debtor the creditor has alternative rights:
he can enforce either the original claim or the accord. Further, there is
authority, and the better view would seem to be, that upon breach of the
executory accord by the creditor, the debtor may specifically enforce the
accord in equity. 1° Some courts, however, continue to hold that an
unexecuted accord is revocable by either party and, therefore, furnishes
no ground for a cause of action."
The decision of the court in the instant case fails to make clear whether
the court is treating the agreement involved as one in which the plaintiff
creditor accepted the promise to pay the $6000 as accord and satisfaction
and thereby extinguished the original claim, or one in which only the
actual payment was to be the satisfaction. 12 But the court seems to recognize
the enforceability of both types of agreement. 13 However, it appears from
the facts found by the trial court that the promise to pay was not accepted
by the plaintiff as satisfaction of the original claim. That court found the
defendant agreed to pay and the plaintiff agreed to accept the $6000 by way
of compromise and settlement of the claim. This language indicates an
intent that only the payment of the $6000 was to be the satisfaction and
that the parties have merely made an agreement of accord.
The principal case appears to be the first case in Oregon which recog-
nizes the enforceability of an executory accord. Although the court
distinguishes State ex rel. Bayer v. Funk" on its facts, it necessarily over-
rules the dicta in that case that ". . . as long as the accord is executory,
it is revocable at will by either party, and neither party can maintain an
action against the other thereon." 15
In holding that the creditor can maintain an action for breach of the
accord, the court adopts the prevailing view. 18 The court does not have
before it the question of whether the executory accord can be pleaded
to execute it, yet it does not extinguish the obligation until it is fully executed."
Discussed in Case Comment, 12 Calif, L. Rev. 411. Similar or identical provisions may
be found in Ala. Code 1940, tit. 9, §§ 1, 2; Georgia Code Ann., §§ 20-1201, 1202;
§§ 58-501, 502, Rev. Codes of Mont. 1947; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33-a(2)(3) and
N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 280(2)(3); §§ 9-1304, 1306, N.D. Rev. Code of 1943; S.D.C.,
§§ 47.0233, 47.0234.
10 Very v. Levy, 54 U.S. 345 (1851); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Imsland, 91
F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1937); Dobias v. White, 239 N.C. 409, 80 S.E.2d 23 (1954);
Loggins v. Stewart, 218 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Restatement, Contracts,
§ 417(d) (1932).
11 Karvalsky v. Becker, 217 Ind. 524, 29 N.E.2d 560 (1940); Whayne Supply
Co. v. I. H. Gregory, 291 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); Konqueror Building and
Loan Ass'n v. G. R. Kinney Co., Inc., 315 Pa. 318, 172 AU. 719 (1934).
12 See supra note 5.
13 The court cites Restatement, Contracts, § 417 (1932) with approval. This
section recognizes the enforceability of executory accords.
14 105 Ore. 134, 209 Pac. 113 (1922).
18 Id. at 152; 209 Pac. at 116.
16 See supra notes 8 and 9.
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as a defense to a suit on the original cause of action if brought by the
creditor before breach of the accord. The court indicates approval, however,
of the common law rule that an executory accord is not a bar to a suit
on the original claim. The sounder view would seem to be that the right
to enforce the original cause of action is suspended until breach of the
contract of accord.17 This would give effect to the apparent intent of the
parties, namely, that the debtor should have the chance to give the satisfac-
tion within the specified time during which he could not be subjected to
an action on the original claim.
The decision, limited by the facts of the case, leaves unanswered the
questions: whether the original cause of action is suspended until breach
of the accord and whether, upon breach of the accord by the creditor, the
debtor can maintain an action for damages or specifically enforce the
accord. It would seem however, that since the court has now apparently
adopted the view that an executory accord is an enforceable contract, the
breaching creditor should be liable to the debtor in an action for damages.
Further, it would not be too great a step to hold that the original cause
of action is suspended until breach of the executory accord. These remedies
are provided in § 417 of the Restatement of Contracts, which also provides
that upon breach by the creditor the debtor may specifically enforce the
accord. It is suggested that when cases arise in these areas the better
course would be to follow these provisions.
JOSEPH P. WARNER
Contracts—Economic Duress.—Wolf v. Marlton Corfroration. 1—Defend-
ant housing developer contracted to build a house for the plaintiff, title to
pass on completion. A down payment of $2450 was made, with a second
payment to be made on the final enclosing of the house. Plaintiff, prior to
the time when the second payment was due, sought to terminate the contract
and proposed that the contractor keep $450 of the down payment upon can-
cellation. Upon the developer's refusal to cancel, plaintiff threatened that
if agreement was not reached on his proposition, he would, on completion
of the contract, resell the house and lot to an undesirable purchaser and
thus ruin the developer's business. Defendant took plaintiff's threats as
a breach of the contract and refused to continue. In suit for recovery of the
down payment, the trial court found for the plaintiff, and the defendant
appealed. The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, remanded
for further findings of facts. If, on further hearings, it is found that the
threats were in fact made and defendant actually believed that they would
be carried out, as a result of which his will was overborne, he was justified
in treating the contract as breached and is entitled to recover whatever
damages resulted therefrom.
11 See supra note 6.
1 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154 A,2d 625 (1959).
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